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Chaining the Dog of War: Comparative Data
Tom Ginsburg*
Abstract
A central function of constitutions is to address issues of international relations,
especially questions of war and peace. This Article descibes trends across time and space in the
treatment of questions of war. It shows that constitutions continue to allocate the power of
declating war, even though such declarations have become meaningless in international law.
There is also a trend toward specfying legislative involvement in approving the actions of
commanders-in-chief The assignment of war powers seems to be driven by copying from
neighboring countries and a county's own previous constitutional histoU. In closing, the final
section of this Article speculates on considerations of optimal constitutional design.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How should powers of war and peace be distributed in democratic
constitutions? This question has been a central one in constitutional design since
the founding of the United States, and has (if anything) gained more importance
in recent years: not only are constitutions frequently rewritten around the world,
but by some accounts, the number of wars has increased as well.' A central
question is whether constitutional design can indeed affect a nation's tendency
to engage in armed conflict and its performance in international crisis
bargaining. And the question relates to international efforts to reduce the levels
and costs of violent conflict.
To understand why constitutional design might matter requires
engagement with the large literature in international relations theory on the
democratic peace. Since the time of Immanuel Kant, scholars have speculated
on the relationship of internal constitutional structure and war. The central
findings of the democratic peace literature can be summarized briefly: (1) mature
democracies generally do not go to war against each other; (2) democracies are,
on the whole, no less warlike (or only slightly less warlike) than autocracies; and
(3) democracies are likely to win the wars that they fight against autocracies. To
illustrate, by one account, democracies win over three quarters of their wars, and
over 93 percent of wars they initiate.2 Putting propositions (1) and (2) together
(and setting asides debate over proposition (2)),3 we can see that democracies are
See Dan Lindley & Ryan Schildkraut, Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and
Misperception as Causes of War (Feb. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, University of Notre
Dame, on file with author) (more major wars initiated with less chance of victory since World
War n1); ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (constitutional lifespans short).
2 DAN REITER & ALAN C. STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR 29 (2003). For a different view on
democracies and war, see Michael Desch, Democragy and Victoy: hy Regime 7)pe Hardly Matters,
INT'L SECURITY, 5 (Fall 2002). Even though Desch questions whether democracies enjoy any
advantages in conflict, he does not support the contention that there is any disadvantage
associated with democracy. See REITER & STAM, supra; Daniel Hemel, Picking up the Peaces:
Democratic Norms, Structural Constraints, and International Security (2007) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Harvard College) (on file with author).
3 The middle proposition of this trifecta is contested. For one view see REITER & STAM, supra note 2,
at 29 (autocracies initiate conflicts against democracies more frequently than democracies do
against autocracies) Stephen L. Quackenbush & Michael Rudy, Evaluating the Monadic Democratic
Peace, 26 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SC. 268, 268 (2009) (democracies initiate wars against
autocracies more frequently than autocracies do against each other); see also Michael Doyle, Kant,
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I, 12 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFFAIRS 205, 225 (1983)
("Liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as any other form of government or society in
their relations with nonliberal states."); William Dixon, Democray and the Peaceful Settlement of
International Conflict, 88 AM. Poi.. Sci. REV. 1 (1994) ("Kant was clearly wrong in his presumption
that democracies are inherently peaceful.") But see James Lee Ray, On the Level(s), Does Democrag
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more likely to go to war against autocracies because they are not fighting fellow
democracies. These statistical regularities, however, are not self-explanatory, and
there is a large debate on the sources of the democratic peace.' Most of this
literature treats states as unitary actors and does not "unpack the black box of
the state" to try to understand specific institutional sources of the democratic
peace.' This is a weakness that can be addressed in part by the availability of
fine-grained data on national constitutions.
In thinking about the project of optimal constitutional design, we need to
understand why it is that democracies may have certain advantages in war. In
particular, it would be helpful to know whether constitutional choices may have
anything to do with the propensity of states to enter into conflict, as the
American Framers imagined. We focus on the question of legislative
involvement in war powers, which was the central concern of the US Founders.
Informed by Machiavelli, the Founders thought that concentrating war powers
in the executive created a risk of tyranny, and also put the national interest at
stake because of the risk of selecting bad wars.' Many other countries have
followed this constitutional design theory, while some have not. This variation
gives us the opportunity to try to understand what factors lead countries to
involve the legislature in decisions about war.
This Article begins with an account of the American Founding and its
influence on constitutional allocation of the power to go to war. It then engages
in a descriptive exercise, demonstrating how states have designed war powers.
Next, it speculates on the factors that would affect an optimal allocation of war
powers, and then provides an empirical analysis to show that the primary
determinants of design choice are probably unrelated to national security
concerns. Instead, we observe that constitutional choices are determined in large
part by the country's constitutional history, with region being another important
determinant.
Correlate nith Peace? in WHAT WE KNow ABOUT WAR 299, 300-2 Oohn A. Vasquez ed., 2000)
(democracies may be more peaceful).
4 Indeed, there have been some recent suggestions that the democratic peace is illusory-that it is
driven by trade patterns or liberal political economies rather than regime type per se. See, for
example, Erik Gartzke, The Capitalist Peace, 51 AM. J. PoL. Sa. 166 (2007); PATRICK MCDONALD,
THE INVISIBLE HAND OF PEACE: CAPITALISM, THE WAR MACHINE, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (2009). Maoz and Russett argue that the democratic peace is driven by
political stability. Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,
1946-1986, 87 AM. PoL. ScI. REv. 624, 630 (1993). Others focus on alliance ties. See Ray, supra
note 3, at 306-7.
5 BARBARA GEDDES, PARADIGMS AND SAND CASTLES: THEORY BUILDING AND RESEARCH DESIGN
IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 193 (1993).
6 FORREIST MCDONAlD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INThllECTUAL HISTORY 42 (1994)
(concerning the Founders' use of Machiavelli).
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II. PROLOGUE: THE AMERICAN DEBATE
War weighed heavily on the minds of the American Framers. Indeed, the
failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide for sufficient national defense
is conventionally thought to have been a primary motive for calling the
Constitutional Convention.! The Articles had granted the Congress the exclusive
power to make treaties, but had not given it the power to enforce them, and
states repeatedly undercut promises made at the national level.' This, along with
an insufficient power of taxation to raise a national army, had put the fledgling
nation at risk.' Another problem was that Congress could not raise funds to
compensate loyalists and British merchants, as required by the Treaty of Paris of
1783, and so the British refrained from withdrawing from their forts in the north
of the country. Border skirmishes involving loyalist militias in Canada persisted.
To the South, the Spanish had closed the Mississippi River to American
shipping in 1784.10 And to the West, Indian tribes proved formidable enemies
against whom the state militias were the only real defense, as the national army
consisted only of a few hundred men.
The Framers came to the war clause in a roundabout fashion. Following
the general contours of the Virginia Plan, a constitutional proposal from the
Virginia delegates, their initial thought was to vest in the national executive all
the executive powers that had been granted to Congress under the Articles of
Confederation." When the time came to discuss the power of war, Charles
Pinckney objected that giving the executive this power would render it
monarchical.12 James Wilson argued that the power was legislative rather than
executive, and hence should be given to Congress." The Committee of Detail
had originally given the power to "make" wars to the Congress.14 This led to a
debate as to whether the power ought to be lodged in the House, or, as
Pinckney argued, the Senate, which was seen as being capable of acting with
greater dispatch." Madison and Gerry then proposed the word "declare" instead
7 FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1973).
8 Articles of Confederation, art. IX (1778).
9 MARKS, supra note 7, at 15.
10 Id. at 24.
11 FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE Doc OF WAR: THE WAR POWER
OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 17 (1986).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 MARKS, supra note 7, at 158.
15 Id. at 158-59. This contrasts with the notion, attributed to George Washington, that the Senate
acts as a place to cool legislation. See Senate Legislative Process, US SENATE, available at
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of "make," as this was seen as allowing the President to make war when needed
to "repel sudden attacks."" Roger Sherman then summarized the view that
"[t]he Executive [should] be able to repel and not to commence war."" As the
distinguished scholar Jack Rakove observes, allowing Congress to declare war
"was another form of encroachment that would compromise the benefits of
holding the president as responsible for the conduct of war as for the
administration of government."" The basic arguments were about accountability
and the risk of executive aggrandizement-Congressional involvement would
slow down war-making except in true emergencies, and this was seen as a good
constraint.
The Framers, of course, lived in a very different era, in which assumptions
about military capabilities, threats to national security, and the functioning of the
executive and legislature were very different from the situation today. As time
has evolved, so has the practice of war-making. Wars are rarely "declared" in a
formal act, as they once were: the last war declared by Congress was World War
11.1' Furthermore, the theoretical advantages of legislative involvement have
been debated over the course of American history as Congress and the President
have sought to come to an accommodation over their respective roles in
wartime.20 Clearly the Founding Fathers intended a reduced role for the
executive, relative to the British monarch. As Hamilton put it in Federalist 69, the
constitutional scheme would take the powers of declaring war, raising and
regulating armies away from the executive, who would be restricted to an
operational role.2' Over the course of American history, however, the formal
language of the Founders has given way to a more pragmatic accommodation.
While the US Constitution clearly assigns to Congress the power to declare war
in Article I, the United States has fought only four declared wars in its history:
the War of 1812, the Spanish American War, and the two World Wars of the
twentieth century. Since the Korean War, and perhaps before, presidents have
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Senate_1egislative-process.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014).
16 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 11, at 18. JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS; POLITICS AND
LAW IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 279 (1997).
17 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 11, at 18.
18 RAKOVE, supra note 16, at 263.
19 BRIEN HALLETT, DECLARING WAR: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND WHAT THE CONSTITUTION
DOES NOT SAY 91 (2012).
20 Id.; W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE
ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? (1981).
21 The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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been routinely willing to conduct "limited" wars without Congressional
authorization.22
Congress no longer insists on formal declarations of war, which in any case
have become outmoded in international law and practice. Even in the eighteenth
century, writers understood that a state of war could be initiated without a
formal declaration, and declaration was sometimes understood not as a formal
pronouncement but simply the entry into a state of hostilities.23 By the twentieth
century, declarations of war became rare in international affairs. One interesting
exception was when the US went to remove strongman Manuel Noriega from
Panama, and he responded by declaring war on the United States. It did not,
however, reciprocate. Globally, since 1990, a total of five declarations or
statements of the existence of war have been issued, four of them in Africa.24
One reason that declarations of war may have become less frequent is that
they have become legally meaningless. Before World War II, international law
distinguished between states of war and states of peace, with different norms
applicable to state behavior. In the era before the United Nations Charter, a
formal declaration of war was an act of legal significance, indicating the view
that the rules governing war were in place.25 However, the postwar regime
moved to a less formalistic definition of war. The United Nations Charter does
not speak of a state of war, but rather the threat or use of force: once an armed
conflict exists, it does not matter whether it is called war or something else.26 For
this reason, the traditional notion that states ought to notify their counterparties
of their intention to engage in war has become less relevant. Furthermore,
declaring war in advance of hostilities is strategically disadvantageous: the
attacker loses any element of surprise.
With the decline of declarations of war, Congress has found itself with less
of a role in war policy and has sometimes sought to gain more power vis-a-vis
the president. The War Powers Act of 1973 (passed over President Nixon's veto
22 Louis Fisher, et al., Letter to the Editor: Congress at IfWar, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 167-69 (May/June
2008), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64297/ouis-fisher-ryan-hendrickson-
and-stephen-r-weissman/congress-at-war.
23 WORMUTH & FiRMAGE, supra note 11, at 18.
24 These are the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict of 1998; the Chadian civil war, which involved a
declaration of war against Sudan on December 23, 2005; the Djibouti-Eritrea conflict of June
2008, and the Heglig crisis between Sudan and South Sudan, in which Sudan acknowledged the
existence of war on April 11, 2012. The non-African case is the 2008 South Ossetia conflict
between Georgia and Russia.
25 The Hague Convention (III) of 1907 explicitly required declarations of war. See The Hague
Convention (III) art. I (Jan. 26, 1910) ("The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a
reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.").
26 UN Charter art. 2, 1 4.
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in 1973) is the centerpiece of this effort. Even as both Republican and
Democratic presidents have challenged the constitutionality of the War Powers
Act and asserted that they did not need congressional authorization, they have
generally observed its terms. (To be sure, they have on occasion bypassed even
the moderate reporting requirements of the Act).27 The War Powers Act does
shape executive decisionmaking. In 1993, when there was a concurrent
resolution of Congress demanding withdrawal from Somalia, President Clinton
complied. Presidents will also report the commitment of troops abroad,
sometimes using the language "consistent with the war powers resolution."28
Congress relied heavily on the constitutional text in passing the War
Powers Act. The War Powers Act begins with the statement that "[i]t is the
purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the Framers of the Constitution of
the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities."2 9 The introduction goes on to recount the constitutionally
assigned powers of the Congress and the president, and asserts that the
president is only able to commit forces pursuant to a declaration of war or
statutory authorization, or in an emergency.30 Discussions of the Constitution
and checks and balances recur throughout the various committee reports that
were generated as the legislation wound its way back and forth through the
House and Senate. In nearly identical language the various House reports
reproduce excerpts from the Constitution and emphasize that the purpose of the
legislation is to "reaffirm" congressional powers granted by the
Constitution. The Senate expressed a concern about Congress's powers with
respect to "undeclared" wars and also extensively referenced the views of
various Framers, Supreme Court justices, and academics throughout history.32
27 Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada without notifying Congress. Later, he sought and
received authorization to deploy Marines to Beirut. Bill Clinton initiated the bombing of Kosovo
in 1999 without authorization from Congress, and succeeded in defeating the Serbs less than two
weeks before the ninety-day period of the War Powers Act expired. In that case, Clinton inferred
congressional "authorization" from an appropriations statute that neither mentioned the War
Powers Resolution nor authorized the military action. See Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. (1999).
28 Exec. Office of the President, Message to Congress-Report Consistent With War powers Resolution (Dec.
13, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/13/message-cong
ress-report-consistent-war-powers-resolution.
29 War Powers Resolution, 50 USC § 1541 (a) (1973).
30Id. § 1541 (c).
31 Seefor exaple, H. Rep. 93-287, 5 (une. 15, 1973); H. Rep. 92-1302, 1 (Aug. 3, 1972).
32 Seefor example, S. Rep. 93-220, 2 (un. 14, 1973); S. Rep. 92-606, 3 (Feb. 9, 1972).
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This emphasis on "restoring" a constitutional balance of powers was
present from the very earliest bill in the lineage of what became the War Powers
Resolution. This was a bill introduced by Representative Bertram Podell of New
York on April 14, 1969, which began by noting that the Constitution grants the
power to declare war to Congress and stated that Congress had been losing this
power to the president." Constitutional considerations suffused the floor
debates on the resolution as well. For example, in the debate about whether to
override the presidential veto of the resolution, Representative Broomfield
spoke in favor of an override, saying: "[t]his historic legislation will, if enacted
into law, reestablish once and for all the traditional war-making responsibilities
which the Framers of the Constitution assigned to Congress 200 years ago."34
Notwithstanding its invocation of the Constitution, Congress seems
generally undermotivated to exercise its constitutional and legal prerogatives,
possibly because of accountability considerations. The public seems to assign
most of the blame or credit for war to the president." If the war works out, the
president will get much of the credit; if it fails, Congress does not want to share
the blame and so avoids getting involved in the decision. Some might say the
Korean War-which was undeclared by Congress-provides an example of this
dynamic.36 However, Article I of the Constitution, assigning some war powers to
Congress, surely gives it a resource to be used in bargaining with the executive,
should the political incentives be present.
In short, the American experience has been motivated by a fear of
executive tyranny. The Founders were so concerned with this that they
introduced a constraint on war powers of the president, which introduced
countervailing risks. By having an executive who could respond to true
emergencies, but also was constrained by Congress in instances of offensive war,
the Framers sought to balance concerns of speed against deliberation. In
modern language, we would characterize the deliberation as helping to "screen"
wars: ensuring that the conflicts that the nation enters into are "good" wars,
while eschewing "bad" wars. Bad wars would be those not in the national
interest, while good ones would be those that are (and would include any war in
which the country was attacked). Deliberation would slow down "bad" wars, but
hopefully not hamper speedy responses to wars of necessity.
These considerations are echoed in the modern literature on the
democratic peace. The basic intuition of the Founders was that legislative
33 H. Con. Res. 91-199, 91st Cong. (1969).
34 119 Cong. Rec. 36, 203 (1973).
35 Fisher et al., supra note 22.
36 Id.
37 See discussion supra at notes 14-16.
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involvement in decisions about war implicates a bargaining process between the
executive and legislature, which in turn might affect international relations. The
modern literature on the democratic peace focuses on international state-to-state
bargaining, which can potentially escalate into war. The democratic advantage in
war, some theorize, results from the need to mobilize support among the public
before going to war. Legislatures can play a role here, most obviously in
constraining overzealous executives by requiring evidence to justify wars."
Another source of democratic advantage is signaling: when the debate about
going to war takes place in public and results in a decision to fight, the
counterparty can more reliably assume that the state in question is really
committed. This might lead the counterparty to back down, accepting a
compromise short of war. War, as has been noted by Professor Gartzke, is in the
''error term"; when both parties have accurate information on capabilities and
intentions they are likely to settle in the shadow of predicted outcomes.39
Legislatures can contribute to this result.
III. WAR POWERS IN OTHER STATES
How have other states assigned the power of war in their constitutions?
This Section presents descriptive data from the Comparative Constitutions
Project on the distribution of power over war. The Comparative Constitutions
Project is an ongoing multiyear effort to code the contents of all the world's
constitutions since 1789.40
A. Trends across Time and Space
"War" writes Philip Bobbitt, "is a natural condition of the State, which was
organized in order to be an effective instrument of violence on behalf of
society."4' It is therefore logical that constitutions-which are political
documents designed to organize the state-typically deal with war and the use of
force. Constitutional rules about war are found in multiple places, including
provisions on formal declarations of war, on the designation and supervision of
the commander-in-chief, and on the related area of emergency powers, which
concerns how the domestic legal order can change in the event of war. We are
primarily concerned with provisions that affect the likelihood of interstate
38 See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in Democracies at War, 29 O.J.L.S. 189 (2009).
39 Erik Gartzke, War Is In the Errr Term, 53 INT'L ORG. 567, 568 (1999).
4 See Comparative Constitutions Project, for a description of the coding rules and methods, along
with the variables. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJEcT, www.comparativeconstitutions
project.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
41 PHILIP BOBBITr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 819 (2007).
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conflict, and so focus on those related to the initiation of hostilities and the
supervision of actions of the commander-in-chief.
As Table 1 indicates, there are a wide variety of approaches to the problem
of declaring war. There seem to be three basic approaches. The most common
(n=230) is that the executive declares war and the legislature has the power to
approve it. (We do not have data on the extent to which a legislative body
actually exercises the power to block declarations.) Legislative declaration
(sometimes involving approval by an upper house) is the next most common
scheme (n=173). Third is the executive declaring war with no approval needed
(n=115). There are, however, many variations. In some systems, the legislature
declares war and the head of state approves.4 2 And in some, legislative approval
is restricted to an upper house.43 Afghanistan's Constitutions of 1977, 1987, and
1990 required the convening of a loya jirga (a grand assembly representing the
entire country) to approve declarations of war."
42 These include the Constitution of Venezuela, § 5(15) (1874); the Constitution of Mexico, § 5(16)
(1824), the Constitution of Italy, art. 78, art. 87(9) (1947); the Constitution of Uruguay, art. 17(7),
art. 81 (1830); the Constitution of Costa Rica, art. 73, art. 102 (1871); the Constitution of Cyprus,
art. 50 (1960); the Constitution of Haiti, art. 73 (1867); the Constitution of Benin, (1979); the
Constitution of Estonia, arts. 128-32 (1937); the Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua,
art. 42(12) 1858); the Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 33, art. 49 (1924); and the
Constitution of Ecuador, art. 34(26) (1945).
43 These include the Constitution of Colombia, art. 98(9) Dec. 1, 1885 (1886); the Constitution of
Colombia, art. 173(5) (2003); the Constitution of the German Empire, art. 11 (1871); the
Constitution of Haiti, art. 8(155) (1816); the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti, art. CXXVII
(1846); the Constitution of the Empire of Haiti, art. 124 (1849); the Constitution of the Republic
of Haiti, art. CXXIII (1874); and the Constitution of Colombia, art. 173(5) (2005).
44 The Constitution of Afghanistan art. 67.3; art. 78.2 (1977); the Constitution of Afghanistan,
art. 75.12 (1980); the Constitution of Afghanistan art. 67 (1990).
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Table 1: Distribution of Legislative Powers over Declaration of War
N=745 national constitutions since 1789
Declare War Approve War
Head of state/government 361 (480/) 17 (2%)
Cabinet 16 (2%) 3 (0%)
First or only legislative house 119 (15%) 143 (19%)
Upper house 11 (1%) 7 (10/)
Either house 4 (0.5%)
Both houses jointly 62 (8%) 133 (18%)
Other 23 (3%) 20 (3/o)
[no approval needed] 35 (5%)
Not specified 219 (29%) 387 (52%)
Interestingly, even newly authored constitutions continue to discuss
declarations of war even though state practice has moved away from this mode
of interaction. This is probably just an instance of what we might call
constitutional boilerplate, in which drafters simply copy language from other
texts.45 We know that constitutional design does not always approximate the
ideal in which institutions are adopted after a process of rational deliberation.46
Instead, designers are constrained by lack of time, experience and knowledge.47
This may lead the drafters to borrow and copy, as if the constitutional language
were a kind of template. We observe, for many constitutional issues, a tendency
45 Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Speadty, Unwritten Understandings and Constitutional Agreement, in
CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY: VALUES AND CONSTITUTIONS, (A. Saj6 & R. Utiz eds., 2010), 69
& 89.
46 JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS (2013).
47 See Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals vs. Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY 15, 19 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).
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for constitutions that are written within the same region and same time period to
have a good deal of similarity.48
The trend over time has been away from the American model of allowing
legislatures to declare war. A more modern approach is to assign the power of
approving the actions of the commander-in-chief to a legislature or other body.4 9
Roughly 12 percent of historical constitutions assign this latter power to one or
both legislative houses. Figure 1 demonstrates the trend graphically. As one can
see, the US approach was influential in the early years of written constitutions,
when there was a good deal of copying from the US in general." Beginning in
the early 1800s, however, the executive became the more popular assignee of the
power to declare war, and this has not changed since.
Figure 1: Primary Assignment of Declaration of War Power
0
0
0
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
year
----- executive - legislature
48 Jose Cheibub et al., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. BIuT.J. POL. Sc. 1 (2013).
49 The commander-in-chief is the person with the ultimate responsibility for military decisions.
Fifty-eight percent of constitutions in our data specify the Head of State as commander-in-chief.
50 See generally, ROBERTO GARGAREILA, The LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS 1776-1860 (2010); David Law & Mila Versteeg, The
Deckning Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 NYU. L. REv. 762 (2012).
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However, the relative decline in popularity of formal legislative declaration
of war has not meant that there is no legislative involvement in decisions about
war policy. Figure 2 shows the same trend graph, but includes constitutions in
which the legislature has a role in approving declarations of war, or approving the
actions of the commander-in-chief. These forms of legislative involvement have
not declined over time, and so globally, legislatures retain a major role in war
policy.
Figure 2: Assignment of War or Command Power
0D-
- -.--
1 1850 1900 1950 2d00
year
- - - - - any executive involvement any legislative involvement
As mentioned above, the larger level of legislative involvement has been
driven in part by the growth in the ability of legislatures to approve the actions
of the commander-in-chief (see Figure 3). A good example of this drafting
approach is the Constitution of the Maldives (2008). Article 243(b) says that:
If the President, as Commander-in-Chief, authorizes or orders the
employment of the Military Service in defence of the Republic or as part of
an international undertaking, the President shall without delay submit the
authorization to the People's Majlis. The People's Majlis may at any time
approve the authorization, or revoke the authorization.51
5 Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, art. 243(b) (2008).
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This approach gives the president the authority to order the deployment of
troops, but provides that the legislature must retroactively authorize it, and
retains a veto over future action. While balancing the concerns of speed and
deliberation that so motivated the American Founders, this approach also
reflects the fact that modern conflict is unlikely to involve formal declarations of
war. In addition, it moves the point of legislative involvement earlier in the
process of conflict; the mere deployment of troops will trigger legislative
scrutiny.
Figure 3: Legislative Power to Approve Actions of Commander-in-Chief
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There is some regional variation in the data. Table 2 provides some
descriptive indication of the distribution of choices in different regions, giving
the percentage of constitutions in each category. We observe great variation:
constitutions written in South Asia and Oceania are very likely to remain silent
on the issue, while those in Latin America have a good deal of regulation.
Countries of the Middle East and North Africa are very executive-centered, a
fact consistent with what we know more generally about their constitutions.52
52 NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NON-CONSTITUTIONAL Wolu-D: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND
THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 112 (2002).
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Table 2: Distribution of Variables by Region
Universe: 745 national constitutions since 1789
Legislature
approves
Legislature Legislature actions of Executive Constitution
declares approves commander- declares silent on
Region (n) war war in-chief war war
Latin America
(318) .26 .38 .10 .43 .35
W. Europe/N.
America (124) .10 .15 .10 .31 .58
E. Europe/post
Soviet (134) .19 .25 .20 .45 .37
Sub-Saharan
Africa (217) .12 .28 .11 .28 .49
Middle East/N
Africa (72) .11 .25 .08 .51 .38
South Asia (28) .04 .14 .07 .14 .75
East Asia (73) .25 .33 .16 .44 .38
Oceania (18) 0 .06 .06 .11 .89
B. The Role of Regime Type
Do different types of political systems have different provisions on war?
To investigate this question we need a categorization of systems of government,
which fortunately we have available from Professor Jose Cheibub and his
colleagues. 3 Their coverage is relatively limited compared to our earlier sample,
as they restrict the analysis to states after 1950. Still, the correlation between
constitutional powers and regime type may be suggestive of the determinants of
the assignment of legislative scrutiny or decision-making power.
Table 3 presents the distribution of powers by regime type. The results are
interesting and suggest that the simple categorization of systems as democratic
or dictatorial does not explain constitutional choices. The regime type most
likely to include legislative role in a declaration of war is that of semi-presidential
53 Jose Cheibub et al., Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, 143 PUB. CHOIcE 67 (2009). Dataset available
at https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-
revisited (last checked Apr. 14, 2014).
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democracy, which features a popularly elected president serving alongside a
government responsible to parliament.5 4 Because of the hybrid nature of such
systems, they often specify the relative powers of executive and legislature in
detail, but they also apparently reflect an imperative to share the power of war
declaration, and so to control the executive. For example, in the Ukraine,
declarations of war are proposed by the president but actually declared by the
parliament." The categories of civilian and military dictatorship look fairly
similar to that of presidential democracy, but monarchies almost never give the
power of declaring war to the legislature." Finally, parliamentary democracies
generally refrain from saying anything at all about the war power.
54 ROBERT ELGIE, SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM (2011).
55 Constitution of Ukraine art. 85.9 (1996) (powers include "declaring war upon the submission by
the President of Ukraine and concluding peace; approving a decision by the President of Ukraine
on the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations in the event of armed
aggression against Ukraine").
56 The sole exception is a borderline case. The Constitution of Morocco of 1962 does not mention
the monarch's ability to declare war, but does say the parliament can authorize the declaration of
war. This might plausibly have been coded as approval rather than declaration. See Constitution of
Morocco, art. 51 (1962) ("Parliament shall authorize the declaration of war.").
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Table 3: Distribution of Variables by Regime Type
Universe: 490 constitutional systems for which Cheibub et al. regime
variable available.
Leg approves
Leg. Leg. actions of Executive Const.
declares approves commander- declares silent on
Variable (n) war war in-chief war war
Parliamentary
Democracy (56) .14 .18 .10 .27 .62
Semi-presidential
Democracy (26) .58 .69 .35 .54 .08
Presidential
Democracy (35) .17 .34 .20 .34 .42
Civilian
Dictatorship (187) .21 .27 .14 .36 .40
Military
Dictatorship (158) .19 .31 .12 .38 .40
Authoritarian
Monarchy (28) .03 .18 0 .57 .39
Some of these findings seem intuitive but others are puzzling. Semi-
presidential regimes, which by their nature feature a division of power between
two executives and a legislature, may need more formal elaboration of the roles
of various actors. But military regimes would not seem to be strong candidates
to provide for legislative control of war policy, unless they are operating with a
faux legislature. The parliamentary regimes may presume that all residual powers
lie with parliament and so not need to state each power explicitly, but then it is
puzzling why any parliamentary regime would ever stipulate that the executive
has the power to declare war without oversight. Furthermore, recent research has
emphasized that many parliamentary regimes have frequent instances of
minority government.s" In such schemes, having legislative approval of decisions
of the executive might mean that government is forced to bargain with the
opposition, which in turn might prevent the country from going to needless war.
IV. OPTIMAL DESIGN & POSITIVE ANALYSIS
We now turn from the descriptive to the normative. What ought to
determine the assignment of war powers in different states? We assume that the
57 KAARE STRoM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RUE 8 (1990).
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ultimate goal of war policy is the advancement of the national interest, however
conceived. Of course, much of political theory wrestles with the question of
which political configuration is best situated to identify and advance the national
interest. In the specific context of war, the American Founders' debates
identified two considerations. First, the legislature might improve the screening
of disputes, so that only wars that are in the national interest are entered into.
The legislature provides a cool second opinion about the merits of the conflict.
Weighted against this, however, are costs in terms of speed and accountability. If
more institutions always added information and improved screening, we ought
to design a war-making process that involved as many governmental bodies as
possible. For example, one might require courts to review the process." But a
decision that is shared by multiple bodies would not only take a good deal of
time to produce, it would potentially dissipate accountability.
There are other benefits from legislative involvement that have been
identified in the literature on war. The importance of public support for
democratic war-making was first identified by Thucydides, who emphasized the
importance of leadership for democratic performance." Legislatures can
facilitate this support for wars, for example by demonstrating unity, or through
elaborating on the rationale for going to war in legislative debates. Legislative
debates thus transmit information to the public, possibly enhancing support for
a war.60
Another benefit exists on the international plane, and involves signaling.
War is typically the last stage in a long process of conflict and bargaining
between at least two states. The presence of a legislature with a voice in war
policy can enhance the quality of the signal given in crisis bargaining at the
international level. If a decision to go to war involves both an executive and
legislative branch, a counterparty will have an indication of a higher level of
support for the war than if only one body is involved. The counterparty will
learn that there is a good deal of domestic support for war, which in turn may
lead the counterparty to believe the executive branch during negotiations.
58 We know of only one constitution that involves a judicial actor in declarations of war, the new
Constitution of Hungary. In this scheme, which is somewhat complex, no approval at all is
needed when parliament declares war; if the head of state declares war because parliament is
unable to do so then the speaker of the house, the president of the constitutional court, and the
head of government must unanimously decide on the justifiability of the declaration; parliament
then decides on justifiability of declaration at its first session thereafter. The Fundamental Law of
Hungary, arts. 48.3-48.6 (2011).
s9 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., 2010) (431
BC).
60 See generaly, STEPHEN HESS, THE WASHINGTON REPORTERS (1981).
61 DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A Gi.OBAI. HISTORY 2 (2006).
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Legislative involvement thus provides a costly signal of seriousness and
commitment, and may encourage counterparties to back down before a full-
fledged war erupts. The costs come from the slow process of legislative
deliberation.
The key variables in sorting out these various costs and benefits are related
to the security situation that the country finds itself in at the time of
constitution-making. Is the country likely to be attacked by powerful neighbors?
If so, there will be a need for speedy decisions and there may be a benefit to
keeping the executive's hands relatively free. Is the security situation such that
the country might need flexibility to engage in offensive wars, with the element
of surprise? This argues for even less constraint. On the other hand, is there a
risk of executive aggrandizement, for example of a leader starting wars abroad
under a pretense to gain internal political support? If so, more constraint is
useful. Is the public skeptical of executive authority so that it will not likely
support a war just on executive say-so? The ability of the legislature to rally
support may be helpful here. Balancing these parameters is obviously a matter
for local determination and we do not assert any universal optimum. But it
arguably suggests that vulnerable states may, on balance, be less likely to
constrain their leaders with legislative checks on war.
Should we expect, then, that these considerations of optimal design will be
met in practice? To the contrary, we have sound reason to believe that such
considerations might not always be given weight in constitution-making. We
know that constitutional design involves a good deal of self-interest and passion,
as well as rationality.62 As Jon Elster has argued at length, these forces might
push away from optimal design for the national interest." Passion represents
strong feelings based on short term emotions; several episodes in the French
Revolution were swayed decisively by the passion of the crowd.64 Interests
concern the narrow advantages of constitutional designers. For example, in the
drafting of the most recent Egyptian Constitution, the judiciary and military
largely insulated themselves from oversight." Beyond passion and interest,
constitutions typically involve a good deal of borrowing from abroad, suggesting
that the project of rational design may be more heuristic than the model.
62 ELSTER, surpra note 46; Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE
L. J. 364 (1995); CHARLES BEARD, AN EcoNoMic INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1913).
63 Elster, Forces and Mechanisms, supra note 62, at 365.
64 ELSTER, supra note 46, at 204-5.
65 Nathan Brown, Egypt's Rulers are About to Make the Same Mistake Morsi Did: Seeds of Discontent in a
New Constitution, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 29, 2013), available at http://www.newrepublic
.com/article/114516/seeds -discontent-new-egyptian-constitution (last checked Apr. 6, 2014).
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Borrowing takes several forms. On the one hand, we know that there is a
good deal of serial continuity in constitutional texts, and that institutions
adopted early in a country's history often persist in subsequent constitutional
replacements."6 We also observe a good deal of similarity among constitutions
associated with different colonial powers." And we also know that constitutions
are often similar to others adopted during the same era. Knowing the region,
era, and country in which a constitution is written predicts many features of the
constitutional text.68
V. PREDICTING LEGISLATIVE WAR POWERS
What are the implications for the observed assignment of war powers?
There are three different sets of variables that are relevant to consider. First are
those characteristics of countries that do not change over time. These would
include factors like colonial tradition and region that would influence the choice
of war powers, as well as the provisions of a country's first constitution. Second,
we need to consider time. In other areas of constitutional design, we observe
trends over time that have been attributed to diffusion from abroad." Third, we
must consider factors that vary over time that might affect the security situation
of the country. We might expect, for example, that more insecure states and
those involved in ongoing conflict would be more likely to concentrate war
authority in the executive, and less likely to assign war powers to the legislature.
In this Section, we run a simple empirical test of the assignment of war
powers. As the primary dependent variable, we draw from the analysis presented
in Figure 2 above to construct a single variable that captures whether the
legislature has any involvement in war-making. We supplement this by
conducting a parallel analysis on constitutions that are silent on the war power.
As independent variables, we ask whether the country is a former British or
French colony, what region of the world the country is found in, and the year in
which the constitution was drafted. To capture constitutional legacies, we also
ask whether or not the country's first constitution included a provision granting
the legislative some role in war. This variable is coded "1" if the first
constitution had such a provision and "0" otherwise. (For countries that have
had only one constitution, we code the variable as a 0.)
6 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 57-58.
67 CHARLES PARKINSON, BiLLs OF RIGHTS AND DiCOLONIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS TERRITORIES (2007).
68 Jose Cheibub et al., supra note 48.
69 David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evoluion and IdeoloD of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV.
1163 (2011).
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For each of our two independent variables (constitutional allocation of war
power to the legislature and constitutional silence on war), we conduct a basic
regression for country characteristics, and a second regression adding variables
related to the security situation. We ask whether or not the state has been
involved in an armed conflict in the past three years, drawing on the Correlates
of War Project, which analyzes the use of force over time.70 The prediction is
that a state that is actively involved in a war or armed conflict will be less likely
to assign the power to the legislature, other things equal. We also ask about the
number of allies a country has, and whether it is a great power, each of which
would predict a more secure environment. As control variables, we include the
Polity2 index capturing the level of democracy in a country and the year of the
constitutional adoption." (We experimented with an additional control for GDP
per capita, which restricts the sample to years after World War II. Results were
comparable to those reported below except that the effect for French colonial
tradition fell shy of statistical significance.)
Because our dependent variable is constructed as binary, the probit model
is most appropriate.72 The model we use is:
Yct = PO + PIXIct + 2X2ct ::: kXkct + U
In this model, Y identifies whether a constitution in country c at time t has a
constitutional requirement of legislative involvement in war policy, X identifies a
series of independent variables associated with the country and year in question,
and uis an error term. Table 3 presents the results.
70 Specifically, we use data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set (v. 3.0) available at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). We focus on conflicts involving the
Use of Force (level 5 in their 6-point scale) or higher.
71 Data on file with authors. In robustness checks we substituted for Polity2 the Unified Democracy
Scores from Daniel Pemstein et al., Democratic Compromise: A Latent Vaiable Analysis ofTen Measmrs
of Regime 'Type, 18 Pot. ANALYSis 426, 438-39 (2010); scores are available at http://www.unified-
democracy-scores.org/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
72 The probit model assumes that while we only observe the values of 0 and I for the dependent
variable, there is a latent, unobserved continuous variable Y* that determines the value of Y. We
assume that Y can be specified as follows:
Yi = PO + PIX 1i + P2Xa + ::: + PkXki + 1i
and that Yi = 1 if Y*i > 0 ; Yi = 0 otherwise.
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Table 3: Probit Models of Legslative Involvement in War-Making
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Legislative Legislative Constitutional Constitutional
involvement in involvement in silence on war silence on war
war war
Year
Democracy
French colony
English colony
Latin America
W. Europe/N.
America
E. Europe/post
Soviet
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Mideast
South Asia
First Constitution
Leg. Involvement
Use of force
Last three years
Number of allies
Major power
0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0007
(0.0037)
0.210***
(0.0633)
0.0513
(0.0585)
0.175**
(0.0782)
-0.0827
(0.0975)
0.160**
(0.0766)
-0.148*
(0.0792)
-0.120
(0.0966)
-0.334***
(0.117)
0.250***
(0.0460)
0.0018
(0.0012)
0.0004
(0.0054)
0.109
(0.103)
0.0102
(0.0947)
0.258*
(0.147)
0.0240
(0.173)
0.238**
(0.116)
0.0234
(0.139)
0.0585
(0.149)
0.0683
(0.247)
0.179***
(0.0676)
-0.0305
(0.182)
-0.0040
(0.0048)
0.0460
(0.165)
9.26e-05
(0.0005)
0.0027
(0.0034)
0.0042
(0.0652)
0.0426
(0.0545)
-0.156**
(0.0692)
-0.0229
(0.0884)
-0.122*
(0.0675)
0.0268
(0.0742)
-0.149**
(0.0730)
0.270*
(0.138)
-0.186***
(0.0441)
-0.0020*
(0.0011)
0.0040
(0.0050)
0.169
(0.110)
0.144
(0.0943)
-0.347***
(0.101)
-0.196*
(0.109)
-0.268***
(0.0755)
-0.224**
(0.102)
-0.309***
(0.0623)
-0.158
(0.163)
-0.103*
(0.0626)
0.214
(0.188)
0.0078*
(0.0044)
0.0253
(0.164)
Observations 723 339 723 339
Pseudo-R2  .10 .06 .05 .05
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Column 1 presents the model with only country characteristics and not
variables related to security. In this model, we see that being a former French
colony, and being located in Latin America or Eastern Europe all enhance the
probability of involvement of the legislature in war-making. South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa are associated with less frequent assignment of war power to the
legislature. (The omitted region is East Asia, so results should be interpreted as
being relative to that region.) The effects for Latin America and Eastern Europe
remain significant even in the second specification (Column 2), when we
introduce additional security-related variables, including whether or not the
country has been recently involved in conflict, the number of allies, and whether
the country is a great power. None of these variables capturing the actual
security situation in the country, whether it has recently been involved in a war
and so less secure, or has many allies and hence is more secure, is a significant
determinant of assignment of constitutional war powers. While this is suggestive,
the sample is smaller because of missing data, and our proxies are crude, so we
have less confidence in the result. We cannot definitively rule out the possibility
that security concerns drive constitutional choices. Furthermore, region may be
correlated with the security situation-some regions are surely more war-prone.
Notice also that the effect of the colonial tradition disappears in this smaller
sample.
Finally, we note in these first two models that the strongest and most
consistent predictor of assignment of war powers to the legislature is whether or
not the country did so in its first constitution. There seems to be a kind of
genetic quality to certain constitutional choices that endure over time even in
very different conditions.
The next two columns repeat the analysis of a different constitutional
decision: whether to say nothing at all about the assignment of war powers. Here
we also observe strong regional effects: relative to East Asia, constitutions
written in other regions are less likely to remain silent on war, and hence more
likely to assign the power somewhere. We also observe a slight time trend away
from silence (consistent with Figure 2). In Column 4, we see that as the number
of allies goes up (presumably meaning that the country is more secure),
constitutions are more likely to remain silent on war. This accords with intuition,
although the effect is quite small. The strongest predictor, again, is the first
constitution in a country's sequence. When the first constitution assigns the war
power to the legislature, later drafters tend to be certain to say something about
the topic, and not leave the power unspecified.
It seems that in this area of constitutional design, we observe the
phenomenon that has been documented in many other areas: there is great
continuity over time within a country, even if it adopts multiple constitutions.
Constitutional design is typically done under conditions of intense time pressure,
and by people with little experience in the field. It is somewhat natural that they
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would turn to models in their work. These models may come from abroad,
especially from neighbors, but also come from the country's own history. Serial
continuity and regional similarity play powerful roles in constitutional design.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Founding Fathers sought to balance the need for national defense and
a quick response to foreign aggression with a desire to constrain executive
ambition. They balanced the two concerns in the clause giving Congress the
power to declare war. Although their specific institutional design has fallen out
of favor, their instinct for legislative control over executive war-making has not.
This Article has demonstrated cross-national trends over time, and has also
shown that a major determinant of assigning legislative powers is the region in
which a country is located, as well as the earlier provisions in a country's
constitutional history. This is consistent with other work on constitutional
drafting. We also speculate briefly on the project of optimal constitutional
design, though we are not sanguine that it obtains given the powerful role of
borrowing in constitutional design.73 We have no illusion that there is a
universally optimal design, as such would require agreement on the normative
goals of war policy. But using the criteria identified by the Founders-the risk of
executive aggrandizement, the value of legislative deliberation, and the threat
from the international environment-it is possible that contemporary
constitutional designers can reason their way to a locally appropriate solution.
Whether they are able to actually get such a solution adopted is another matter
entirely.
73 Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC CHolCE 261-82
(Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds. 2010).
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